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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, Raul Ernesto Morales-Ramos of El Salvador was
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 1 He was
* Khou Yang, J.D. Candidate 2022 at Mitchell Hamline School of Law. She is a
Law Clerk with Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Co-President of the
Mitchell Hamline Asian Pacific American Law Student Association, and CoDirector for the Michell Hamline Self-Help Clinic.
1
Clara Long, Systemic Indifference: Dangerous & Substandard Medical Care
in US Immigration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 8, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/05/08/systemic-indifference/dangeroussubstandard-medical-care-us-immigration-detention [https://perma.cc/3HCNHRF4].

94

placed in the Theo Lacy Facility, operated by the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department, and then transferred to Adelanto Detention
Facility, a private detention center operated by GEO Group. 2 Both
facilities had contracts with ICE. 3 In 2015, Morales-Ramos died at
Palmdale Regional Medical Center in California of organ failure
with signs of widespread cancer. 4 An ICE investigation into his
death found that the medical care provided to him at the detention
centers failed to meet the required federal standard of care. 5
Morales-Ramos had symptoms of cancer starting in 2013, but the
facilities failed to address the symptoms until a month before he
died. 6
In 2017, a 31-year-old asylum seeker was detained at the
United States-Mexico border and placed in a holding cell for
twenty-four hours. 7 She was four months pregnant. 8 While in
holding, she started to experience pain and heavy bleeding. 9 She
sought help, but her request went ignored by detention center staff. 10
She was eventually transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center, a
private facility owned by CoreCivic in southern California. They
transferred her to a hospital, where she miscarried. 11 She was then
returned to the detention center and was not provided any postmiscarriage care. 12 Months later, she was still in pain from the
miscarriage. 13
2
Id. (GEO Group is one of the largest private companies that contracts with ICE
to run immigration detention centers).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
ICE, JICMS #201505282, DETAINEE DEATH REVIEW - RAUL ERNESTO
MORALES-RAMOS 14–15, 34–15, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/reports/ddrmorales.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWC5-9VBZ] (last visited Mar. 26, 2022).
6
Long, supra note 1.
7
Victoria Lopez, The Federal Government is detaining Pregnant Immigrants in
Violation of Its Own Policy, ACLU, (Sept. 26, 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-anddetention/federal-government-detaining-pregnant [https://perma.cc/ZRY88DPU].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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Unfortunate as these cases may be, they are not outliers.
Many reports show that the living conditions inside detention
centers do not meet the national detention standards required by
ICE. 14 Medical neglect, nutritional issues, and prolonged detention
are among the top reported abuses in detention centers. 15 There are
over 20,000 people in immigration detention centers. Of these
20,000, 74.6 percent have no criminal records. 16 Under the Trump
Administration, immigration detention expanded; ICE increased the
size of the immigration detention system by 50 percent and opened
40 new detention facilities. 17
Private immigration detention centers are a profitable
business and President Biden’s prison reform policy amplifies the
amount of contracting between private companies and ICE. Private
Detention Centers are now a multimillion-dollar industry that
continues to lack government oversight. To understand how the
business came to be so lucrative and why it would be extremely
difficult to dismantle, it is important to have context on the history
of immigration in the United States. This includes looking at the
country’s deeply rooted mistreatment of certain immigrant
populations, as well as the federal government’s reactions to the
9/11 terrorist attacks and how that event forever changed the
landscape of U.S. immigration. It is equally important to know the
history of the contracts between federal agencies and private
companies and the present functions of these contracts.
In January 2021, President Joe Biden signed an executive
order to phase out the federal government’s contracts with private
Condition in Migrant Detention Centers, AM. OVERSIGHT (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.americanoversight.org/investigation/conditions-in-migrantdetention-centers [https://perma.cc/9WJQ-3BAL].
15
Detention by the Numbers, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-statistics (last visited Oct. 24,
2021).
16
Immigration Detention Quick Facts, TRACIMMIGRATION,
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/quickfacts/ [https://perma.cc/K5QA-JPTC] (last
visited Jan. 7, 2022).
17
Eunice Cho, More of the Same: Private Prison Corporations and Immigration
Detention Under the Biden Administration, ACLU (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/more-of-the-same-private-prisoncorporations-and-immigration-detention-under-the-biden-administration/
[https://perma.cc/2EYP-TQYN].
14
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prisons. 18 However, the executive order stops short of addressing
the frequent practice of the government contracting with private
companies to operate immigration detention centers. The order is
specific to contracts with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the
United States Marshals Services (USMS). 19 It does not address
private immigration detention centers operated under ICE. 20
President Biden may have put an end to privatized prisons;
however, he missed an opportunity to abolish private detention
centers. As it stands, the policy allows private companies to
continue their contract with ICE. Facilities that have lost their prison
contract with the Bureau of Prisons are in turn contracting with ICE
to reopen prison facilities as detention centers. 21 In a report to its
shareholders, GEO Group Inc. indicated that it plans to market “to
other federal and state agencies.” 22 Immigration advocates were
stunned that President Biden failed to address the private
contracting of immigration detention. 23 Many point out that the
policy would have a greater impact on immigration detention
compared to the effects it has on criminal justice reform. 24
This article will review immigration policies that have
impacted the U.S. immigration system and the private detention
center system. It will discuss President Biden's executive order to
phase out contracts with private prisons and why it failed to include
the phase out of private detention centers. The article first looks at
the history of the immigration system in the United States and the
deeply rooted issues of medical abuse in immigration detention
18

Executive Order on Reforming Our Incarceration System to Eliminate the Use
of Privately Operated Criminal Detention Facilities, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 26,
2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2021/01/26/executive-order-reforming-our-incarceration-system-toeliminate-the-use-of-privately-operated-criminal-detention-facilities/
[https://perma.cc/S2JE-9NBM].
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Cho, supra note 17.
22
Form 10-K Annual Report, GEO Group INC, at 6 (Dec. 31, 2020),
https://seekingalpha.com/filings/pdf/14711618 [https://perma.cc/6VS6-WN54].
23
Scott Bixby, Activists Wants to Know: Why the Hell Did Biden Keep These
Private Prisons?, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/activists-want-to-know-why-the-hell-did-joekeep-these-private-prisons.
24
Id.
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centers. It then examines the contracts between ICE and private
companies and the lack of oversight of privatized detention centers.
Lastly, the article discusses recommendations for how the United
States should regulate detention centers.
II. BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
The United States’ population includes over 40 million
people who were born in another country. 25 In 2017, the Pew
Research Center reported that there were 10.5 million unauthorized
immigrants in the United States, 26 4.9 million of whom are
identified to be from Mexico, 1.9 million from Central America, and
1.5 million from Asia. 27 Immigrants in the United States account for
one-fifth of the world's migrants. About three million immigrants in
the United States are part of the Refugee Resettlement Program. 28
Immigration is not a new concept to the United States.
Anyone who knows U.S. history knows that immigration dates to
the 1600s when the Pilgrims arrived in search of religious
freedom. 29 Prior to the nation's founding and the Constitution’s
ratification, immigration was recognized by the British parliament
and encouraged as a way for the British Crown to settle people into
the colonies. After the nation's founding in 1776, immigrants in the
United States were granted citizenship by pledging their allegiance
to the nation. 30 It was not until 1790 that Congress passed the
Abby Budiman, Key findings about U.S. Immigrants, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/keyfindings-about-u-s-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/5EGR-V8XC].
26
Jens Manuel Krogstand, Jefferey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About
Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/5-facts-about-illegalimmigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/2FSX-7KA5].
27
Id.
28
See Budiman, supra note 25.
29
HISTORY.COM Editors, U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/u-s-immigration-before-1965
[https://perma.cc/J3D2-ACQL] (last updated Sept. 10, 2021).
30
Andrew M. Baxter & Alex Nowrasteh, A Brief History of U.S. Immigration
Policy from the Colonial Period to the Present Day, CATO INST. (Aug. 3, 2021),
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/brief-history-us-immigration-policy25
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Naturalization Act, “extending citizenship to free white persons of
good character who had resided in the United States for two years
and took the oath of allegiance.” 31 Congress later passed the
Naturalization Act of 1795, changing the residency requirement for
naturalization to five years, requiring that prospective citizens
declare their intention for naturalization three years in advance. 32
The United States experienced its first wave of immigration
during the colonial era. However, it was in the second wave of
immigration in the 1800s that the United States started to enforce
stricter immigration policies. 33 At the start of the 1800s, most
immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe. 34 In the mid1800s, the United States saw many Asian immigrants lured in
through the California gold rush. 35 The influx of immigrants gave
rise to anti-immigrant sentiments resulting in the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882 passed by President Chester A. Arthur, which
suspended Chinese immigration to the United States for ten years
and declared that Chinese immigrants were ineligible for
naturalization. 36 To maintain control over immigrants, Congress
passed the Immigration Act of 1891 – which created the Office of
the Superintendent of Immigration within the Department of the
Treasury and gave authorities power to deport immigrants who
violated the law. 37 This led to the first immigration detention facility
on Ellis Island, New York, in 1891 and eventually the second
immigration detention facility in Angel Island, California, in
1910. 38
colonial-period-present-day#voluntary-forced-migration
[https://perma.cc/94TC-JU7G].
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
U.S. Immigration Before 1965, supra note 29.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
HISTORY.COM Staff, Chinese Exclusion Act, HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/chinese-exclusion-act-1882
[https://perma.cc/3J5K-AUVC] (last updated Sept. 13, 2019).
37
Rosemary Vega, Immigration Courts: From Past to Present, HOUS. L.,
Nov./Dec. 2016, at 10.
38
A Short History of Immigration Detention, FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/detention-timeline
[https://perma.cc/29MZ-2LXF] (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
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In 1914, the United States Public Health Services “allied
itself with the eugenic movements as a way to regulate the
reproductive capacity of people deemed defective, undesirable, and
harmful to society, including those who were labeled sexual or
criminal deviants, people of color, poor, disabled, and
immigrants.” 39 The eugenic movement promoted selective breeding
for positive traits. 40 State legislators adopted laws that led to the
forced sterilization of people who possessed undesirable traits. 41
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these laws. 42 In
Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
Virginia's state law to sterilize “feeble minded” individuals to
prevent them from producing “feeble minded” offspring. 43 By the
time the eugenics movement ended in 1940, 33 states had forced
sterilization programs and over 65,000 people were sterilized. 44
The eugenics movement considered immigrants to be dirty,
diseased, and hyper-fertile. 45 Forced sterilization was used to
restrain immigrant reproduction. 46 Inside detention centers,
immigration officials used dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane
(DDT) and other sterilizing agents on Mexican migrants. 47 Outside
of detention centers, Latina women were coerced into undergoing
forced sterilization by medical professionals. 48 In Madrigal v.
Quilligan, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
defendant, Los Angeles County USC Medical Center, was not
responsible for the forced sterilization of the women because the
Jessica Ordaz, Migrant Detention Centers Have A Long History of Medical
Neglect and Abuse, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/18/migrant-detentioncenters-have-long-history-medical-neglect-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/2CG5NV8Z].
40
Kevin E. Grady, A Review of Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the
Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296–97 (2010).
41
Id.
42
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
43
Id. at 207.
44
Introduction to Eugenics, GENETICS GENERATION,
https://knowgenetics.org/history-of-eugenics/ [https://perma.cc/7AW4-4D2N]
(last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
45
Ordaz, supra note 39.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Madrigal v. Quilligan, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981).
39
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doctors did not have bad intentions and reasoned that the unwanted
sterilization was a result of miscommunication and a language
barrier. 49
As the United States’ population grew, so did its
immigration policies and detention of migrants. In the 1980s, the
United States began a mass detention of Cubans, Haitians, and
Central Americans who were fleeing totalitarian governments and
civil wars. 50 President Reagan’s “War on Drugs” introduced
immigration detention policies aimed towards punishing and
deterring Latin American migration. 51 The Reagan administration
“increased militarization of border enforcement and conflation of
drug and immigration enforcement through interdiction
programs.” 52 Under President Reagan, the first private prison
company was formed with Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA)—which in 2016 CCA changed its name to CoreCivic. 53 In
1991, President George H. Bush opened an immigration detention
center in Guantanamo Bay—which was previously a naval base that
held prisoners of war indefinitely but was used to hold asylum
seekers and refugees. 54
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, immigration became
a national security issue for the United States. 55 President George
W. Bush restructured government agencies and refocused the
country’s immigration policies. 56 This started the removal of aliens
through ICE. 57 In 2014, the Obama Administration implemented
strict immigration policies for border control and detained many
immigrants through ICE. President Obama deported more than two
49

Id.
A Short History of Immigration Detention, supra note 38.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Immigration Detention 101, DET. WATCH NETWORK,
https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101
[https://perma.cc/DV2L-HE2Y] (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
56
Camille J. Mackler, Immigration Policy Before and After 9/11, JUST SEC.
(Sept. 9, 2011), https://www.justsecurity.org/78132/immigration-policy-beforeand-after-9-11-from-the-ins-to-dhs-where-did-we-go-wrong/
[https://perma.cc/K9XJ-U9PK].
57
Immigration Detention 101, supra note 55.
50
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million immigrants during his eight years in office. 58 However, the
Obama Administration was lenient on pregnant women and
generally did not detain them unless their detention was mandatory
under the law or when extraordinary circumstances warranted
detention. 59 In addition, the Obama administration spent millions of
dollars to get children and families screened and pushed them
through the immigration judicial system to be reunited with their
families. 60 The administration also spent money on media
campaigns to deter families from coming to the United States. 61
Under the Trump Administration, immigration declined by
49 percent, naturalization slowed, and the cost to become an
American citizen increased more than 80 percent, from $640 to
$1,160. 62 On January 25, 2017, the Trump Administration signed
Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of
the United States, which directed ICE to enforce immigration laws
against all removable aliens. 63 Additionally, the Trump
Administration did away with the presumption of release for all
pregnant detainees that the Obama Administration had
implemented. In the first four months after Executive Order 13768
was implemented, 506 pregnant women were detained. 64

Dara Lind, What Obama Did With Migrant Families vs. What Trump Is
Doing, VOX (June 21, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/21/17488458/obama-immigration-policy-familyseparation-border.
59
Memorandum from Thomas Homan Executive Associate Director of U.S.
Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. to U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t 2 (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2016/11032.2_Ide
ntificationMonitoringPregnantDetainees.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSZ5-XGN5].
60
See Lind supra, note 58.
61
Id.
62
Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump Immigration Policy, FORBES (Aug. 26,
2020, 2:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/factcheck-and-review-of-trump-immigration-policy/?sh=6f32f84056c0 (stating that
the reduction of immigrants by 49 percent was not due to any policies that the
Trump Administration passed, and the reduction was caused by Trump coming
into office).
63
Id.
64
Liz Jones, Pregnant and Detained, NPR (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:29 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/05/599802820/pregnant-and-detained
[https://perma.cc/CV9S-SQYM].
58
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The Trump Administration enforced its “Zero Tolerance”
Immigration Enforcement Policy, which prosecuted all adult aliens
who crossed the border illegally, with no exception for asylum
seekers or those with minor children. 65 Children were detained and
placed in settings deemed appropriate for their age and special
needs. 66 “Under the Administration's zero tolerance policy, 658
children were separated from 638 adults who were referred for
prosecution between May 7 and May 21, 2018.” 67 They were only
allowed to remain in family immigration detention for a total of
twenty days 68. If their parents or guardians were not released by the
end of the twenty days, the children were treated as unaccompanied
minors and sent to the ORR for care and custody. 69 When President
Biden took office in 2020, he reversed some of the immigration

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “ZERO
TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1 (July 20, 2018),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45266/7.
66
Abbie Gruwell, Unaccompanied Minors and the Flores Settlement
Agreement, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/30/unaccompanied-minors-and-the-floressettlement-agreement-what-to-know.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZL85-GZQE]
(explaining that the Flores Settlement Agreement is a stipulated settlement
agreement that arose out of Flores v. Reno, a 1987 California class action that
set national standards for the treatment and placement of minors in Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) custody). The Flores Settlement Agreement
established licensing authority over detention facilities and defined “licensed
program” as a program, agency or organization that is licensed to prove
residential, group or foster care for children through appropriate state agencies.
Id. Children in INS custody were required to be placed in the least restrictive
setting appropriate to the child’s age and special needs. Id. It mandated that INS
operate a “policy favoring release to a parent, legal guardian, adult relative or
licensed program.” Id.
67
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 65, at 13 (citing testimony
of Richard Hudson, Deputy Chief of the Operations Program, Law Enforcement
Operations Directorate, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Border Security and
Immigration, TVPRA and Exploited Loopholes Affecting Unaccompanied Alien
Children, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., May 23, 2018).
68
Id.
69
Id.
65
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policies that the Trump Administration had enforced 70— more on
this later.
A. The U.S. Immigration System
The U.S. immigration system is complex with different
entities overseeing various aspects of immigration. Historically, the
U.S. immigration system was governed by Immigrant and
Naturalization Services (INS) – which reunited the Bureau of
Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization. 71 INS was dedicated
to enforcement of immigration law in the United States.72
Gradually, agency responsibilities increased under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 – which charged INS with
enforcing sanctions against employers who hired undocumented
immigrants. 73 Following the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, President Bush started the “War on Terror,” and Congress
passed the USA Patriot Act, which expanded surveillance capacities
and heightened its targeting of Arab and Muslim immigrants for
detention. 74 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was
created and the former INS was dissolved and reformed into three
branches: the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE. 75
Today, DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) oversee agencies that
In His First 100 days in Office, President Joe Biden Has Advanced Three
Times as Many Executive Actions on Immigration as Donald Trump Did,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/first-100-days-office-biden-executiveactions [https://perma.cc/EL3X-HLX9].
71
OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, USCIS 7,
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/INSHistory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DS2Q-YMN6] (last visited Jan. 4, 2022).
72
Id. at 7.
73
Id. at 10.
74
A Short History of Immigration Detention, supra note 38; see also Patriot Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No., 107–56 (2001) (Congress passed The Patriot Act
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States. The act
was created to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States, and around
the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tolls, and other purpose.”).
75
A Short History of Immigration Detention, supra note 38.
70
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detain noncitizens. 76 HHS oversees the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR), DOJ oversees the USMS, and DHS oversees
CBP and ICE. 77 Under DHS, CBP and ICE perform similar duties
in enforcing immigration laws to protect the United States, but the
agencies differ in jurisdictions and applications. CBP's jurisdiction
covers the United States’ borders and waterways that allow access
into the country, whereas ICE's jurisdiction is strictly within the
United States. CBP enforces immigration laws by investigating,
arresting, and detaining aliens within ninety-nine miles of land
borders. 78 ICE works to strengthen border security and prevent the
illegal movement of people, goods, and funds into, within, and out
of the United States. 79 Its primary mission is to promote homeland
security and public safety through the criminal and civil
enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs,
trade, and immigration. 80 ORR provides benefits and services to
assist with the resettlement and local integration of specific eligible
populations, including refugees, asylees, Cuban/Haitian entrants,
Special Immigrant Visa Holders, Amerasians, and Victims of

Immigration Detention in the United States by Agency, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL
(Jan. 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immig
ration_detention_in_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFB6FDNZ] (laying out the organizational structure of the United States government
agencies that oversee immigration and detention of noncitizens); See also
Andrew R. Arthur, Defining Immigrants, Noncitizens, Aliens, Nonimmigrants
and Nationals, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (June 26, 2017),
https://cis.org/Arthur/Defining-Immigrants-Noncitizens-Aliens-NonimmigrantsandNationals#:~:text=So%2C%20citizens%20are%20nationals%20of,nationals%2
0who%20are%20not%20citizens [https://perma.cc/UW2R-YK4G] (defining
noncitizens as a term that includes aliens, and nationals who are not citizens of
the United States).
77
See Immigration Detention in the United States by Agency, supra at note 76.
78
Sarah E. Murphy, Federal Immigration Agencies Overview, BORDER IMMIGR.
L., http://www.borderimmigrationlawyer.com/overview-of-federal-immigratio/
[https://perma.cc/A2G9-VYS3] (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
79
ICE’s Missions, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/mission [https://perma.cc/F6EXDLGT] (last visited Sept. 14, 2021).
80
Id.
76
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Trafficking. 81 USMS is the nation's oldest and most versatile federal
law enforcement agency. 82 It “provides security to the federal
judiciary and manages the witness security program.” 83 In addition,
USMS is responsible for the confinement and transportation of
federal prisoners to the Bureau of Prisons and fugitive
investigation. 84
III. ANALYSIS: CONTACTING BETWEEN FEDERAL AGENCIES AND
PRIVATE COMPANIES
The contracting between federal agencies and private
companies for detention centers started around 1983 when CCA
opened its first private prison in Texas. 85 Since then, contracting
between private companies and federal immigration agencies has
become an extremely profitable business. 86 In 2009, the United
States spent $1.9 billion on immigration detention; a decade later,
in 2019, it spent $3.5 billion. 87
The reorganization of the immigration system in 2001 put
immigration detention centers under the purview of ICE. 88 The
purpose of immigration detention centers and programs is to hold,
process and prepare immigrants for possible deportation. 89 ICE
What We Do, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERV. ADMIN. CHILD. & FAM. (Feb. 18, 2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/5NGF-YBC7].
82
Major Responsibilities of the U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. MARSHALS SERV.,
https://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/ [https://perma.cc/XK2C-74WS] (last
visited Nov. 10, 2021).
83
U.S. Marshal Services, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/u-smarshals-service [https://perma.cc/832Q-E4QA] (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
84
Id.
85
See A Short History of Immigration Detention, supra note 38.
86
Monsy Alvarado et al., These People Are Profitable, USA TODAY (Dec. 19,
2019), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/12/19/icedetention-private-prisons-expands-under-trump-administration/4393366002/
[https://perma.cc/PF8Q-ED4P].
87
Id.
88
See A Short History of Immigration Detention, supra note 38.
89
Sharita Gruberg, How For-Profit Companies Are Driving Immigration
Detention Policies, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-for-profit-companies-aredriving-immigration-detention-policies/ [https://perma.cc/LQ8S-HAZV].
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operates more than 200 detention facilities in the nation, 90 62 of
which are reported to be run by private companies contracted with
ICE and account for more than 75 percent of the detained immigrant
population. 91 ICE facilities consist of Non-Dedicated
Intergovernmental Services Agreements (IGSA), Dedicated
Intergovernmental Services Agreements (DIGSA), Family
Residential
Centers
(FRC),
U.S.
Marshals
Service
Intergovernmental Agreements (USMS IGA), Service Processing
Centers (SPC), and Contract Detention Facilities (CDF). 92 Each
detention facility signs an independent contract with ICE, and they
manage a different aspect of the immigration detention system:
“Non-Dedicated
Intergovernmental
Service
Agreements (IGSA): Facilities owned by state or
local governments, or private companies, which
contract to hold people for ICE as well as other
agencies, either together or separately; Dedicated
Intergovernmental
Service
Agreements
(DIGSA): Facilities owned by state or local
governments or private companies operated
exclusively under an agreement with ICE to hold
people in immigration proceedings; U.S. Marshals
Service Intergovernmental Agreements (USMS
IGA): Contracted by the U.S. Marshals Service and
used by ICE through a rider on the contract to detain
people on behalf of ICE; Service Processing Centers
(SPC): Facilities owned by ICE and generally
operated by contracted detention staff. ICE contracts
with private companies for services such as guards,
food, and facility maintenance; Contract Detention
Facilities (CDF): Facilities owned and operated by

90
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Alvarado et al., supra note 86.
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Jesse Franzblau, Cut the Contracts: It’s Time to End ICE’s Corrupt Detention
Management System, NAT. IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/policy-brief-cut-contracts-its-timeend-ices-corrupt-detention-management-system [https://perma.cc/GS9S-SX9J].
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private companies and contracted directly by ICE to
exclusively hold people in ICE custody.” 93
USMS is a frequent user of private detention centers. 94 Since
the agency does not have prisons of its own, it contracts with
federal, state, local, and private jails nationwide to house prisoners
and detainees. 95 From 2010 to 2013, more than 80,000 people were
in detention, facing prosecution for federal immigration crimes. 96
In 2021, Congress gave ICE nearly $3 billion to maintain its
200-plus detention centers. 97 GEO Group, CoreCivic, LaSalle
Corrections, Management & Training Corporation (MTC), and
Immigration Centers of America are the top five private companies
that profit from the lucrative business of detention centers. 98 In
2019, the GEO Group and CoreCivic generated billions of dollars
in revenue – GEO Group at $2.35 billion and CoreCivic at $1.9
billion.99 Contracts between ICE and detention centers are generally
long-term, extending past ten years, and require minimal
transparency or oversight. For example, ICE signed fifteen-year
contracts with the GEO group for their Adelanto and Mesa Verde
detention centers, CoreCivic's Otay Mesa Detention Center, and
MTC's Imperial Regional Detention Center. 100
ICE has been under fire for its contract negotiations with
detention centers in recent year, one of which is the “pass-through”
agreement. 101 “Pass-through” agreements, allow local officials to
93
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Seth Freed Wessler, Inside the US Marshal’s Secretive, Deadly Detention
Empire, MOTHER JONES (Nov./Dec. 2019),
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act as the “middleman” for ICE and the private companies. 102 In
2018, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audited ICE's IGSA
with the City of Eloy, Arizona. 103 It found that in 2014 ICE had
improperly modified an existing IGSA with the City of Eloy to
establish the 2,400-bed South Texas Family Residential Center in
Dilley, Texas. 104 ICE was already in contract with CCA, to operate
the residential center, but in modifying the IGSA with Eloy, ICE
unnecessarily made Eloy the middleman between ICE and CCA;
Eloy collected $438,000 in annual fees. 105 The OIG concluded that
“ICE's policies and procedures for negotiating, executing, and
modifying IGSAs are insufficient and lack specific guidance for the
appropriate use of IGSAs. Consequently, ICE may have overpaid
for detention services at the South Texas Family Residential Center,
as well as other detention facilities.” 106 A January 2021 report
conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office
(GAO) found that ICE had entered into forty contracts and
agreements for new detention centers from 2017 to May 11,
2020. 107 Of these forty contracts, twenty-eight did not have
documentation from ICE showing a need for space, outreach to
local officials, or even a basis for ICE's decision to enter into the
contracts, as is required by ICE's contracting process. 108 ICE
contends that there is no legal requirement to award an IGSA
competitively. 109
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A. Private Detention Centers Are a Lucrative Business
So, how exactly do these private companies profit from
detaining immigrants? As discussed above, ICE's “pass-through”
contracts likely contributed to the success of the detention center
business. Additionally, income for detention centers correlates with
how many individuals are detained. 110 Compared to states and local
governments, ICE pays higher premiums per detainee. 111 In an
interview with USA Today, Alex Friedmann of the nonprofit
Human Rights Defense Center in Nashville, Tennessee, stated,
“[j]ails typically pay private companies $35 to $40 per day per
inmate, while state prisons pay $55 to $65 per day. ICE can pay up
to $300 per detainee. Children and families are worth the most per
head.” 112 ICE's increased pay of detainees creates an incentive for
detention centers to increase their detainee population and keep
people detained longer to generate more money. 113 When Trump
took office in 2016, private corporations jumped at the opportunity
to invest in the immigration detention business. 114
In the years that Donald Trump was in office, 24
immigration detention centers and more than 17,000 beds were
added to detention facilities run by ICE. 115 LaSalle Corrections
opened six more facilities holding more than 7,000 detainees each.
In 2019, GEO Group operated 22 facilities; CoreCivic, 19 facilities;
LaSalle Corrections, 14 facilities; Management & Training
Corporation, 6 facilities; and Immigration Centers of America, 1
facility. 116 As of September 2021, 79 percent of people detained
each day in ICE custody are detained in private detention facilities,
and the average length of stay is 48.1 days. 117 Some lengths of stay
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117
FY 2021 DETENTION STATISTICS, USCIS (2021). See Table: ICE Average
length of Stay Adult Facility Type by Moth and Arresting Agency: FY2021
YTD. The average detention stays for some detention centers extend past the
average 48.1 days. Id. The data shows that the detention stay for some centers
average one hundred days. Id.
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extend past 48 days, lasting anywhere from six months to five
years. 118
However, private companies are not the only ones benefiting
from contracts with federal agencies. State prisons, federal prisons,
and nonprofit agencies all collect from contracts with the federal
immigration agencies. 119 For example, Southwest Key Programs, a
nonprofit organization, has a $460 million contract with HHS to
house migrant children and teens. 120 The CEO of Southwest Key
Programs earned nearly $1.5 million in 2016 and doubled that in
2017 totaling $3.6 million. 121
After Trump was elected to office, the private prison
industry boomed. 122 Not only did private companies get increased
payments from ICE for the detention of immigrants, but they also
received massive investments from banks. 123 GEO Group and
CoreCivic received investments from Wells Fargo, JP Morgan
Chase, and Bank of America. 124 These banks have provided
substantial capital for private companies to continue to expand their
detention center grounds. 125 “Chase alone provided a $13 million
loan to CoreCivic and gave more than $250 million in revolving
credit” to CoreCivic and GEO Group. 126 The GEO Group executive
vice president of corporate relations told USA Today that GEO

Id.; See also FREEDOM FOR IMMIGRANTS, supra note 15 (stating that only
seven percent of the detainees that they help are held for less than six months
and forty-eight percent are held in immigrant detention for two to four years and
about five percent are held for over four years).
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Group “own[s] 80 facilities that have tens of thousands of square
footage . . . .” 127
B. Federal Agencies Lack Oversight Over Private Facilities
But how exactly does ICE manage to regulate their detention
centers, and are the detention centers up to standards? ICE
implemented two types of standards to regulate their contracted
facilities, the Performance-Based National Detention Standard
(PBNDS) and the National Detention Standards (NDS). 128 The
PBNDS is used for immigration detention facilities and the NDS for
non-dedicated facilities, which are contracted facilities that are not
used solely for immigration detention. 129
The PBNDS and the NDS provide standards for safety,
security, and care for detainees, such as the standard of living, food
services, medical care, and health services. 130 ICE implemented the
PBNDS as a standard for all detention centers, private or public. 131
It aims to maintain “a safe, secure detention environment for staff
and detainees” by working to improve “medical and mental health
services, increase access to legal services and religious
opportunities, improve communication with detainees with limited
English proficiency, improve the process for reporting and
responding to complaints, and increase recreation and visitation.”132
The NDS reflects ICE's “commitment to working with states and
local partners to enforce immigration laws and improve public
Alvarado et al., supra note 86.
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USCIS, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2019/nds2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/23MW-6RHG] (last revised 2019). See also, PBNDS 2011,
REV. 2016, USCIS (2016), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionstandards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DMQ-VTST].
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safety and national security.” 133 It encourages better communication
between facilities and local ICE enforcement and applies to 45 ICE
Intergovernmental Services Agreement (IGSA) facilities, 35 USMS
facilities, and 60 facilities that do not meet the ICE annual
inspections threshold. 134
However, reports show that ICE detention facilities fail to
meet PBNDS and NDS standards, 135 partly because the standards
are not law and are therefore non-binding. 136 Private facilities can
easily “operate outside the purview of public oversight and
accountability.” 137 Privately owned immigration detention centers
have a track record of understaffing their departments, abusing and
neglecting the detainees, and providing substandard medical
services that ultimately lead to detainee illness or death. 138 Private
companies are incentivized to cut down on medical staffing and
deny care to maximize shareholder return. 139 Private detention
centers have a reputation for detainee abuse and neglect because the
federal agency lacks proper oversight of the facilities. 140 Without
proper regulation and control over these for-profit detention centers,
facilities neglect the needs of detainees and continue to collect
money from the federal government. 141 A report by the OIG in
2019, following a series of visits to detention facilities, showed that
ICE was not adequately monitoring or enforcing the PBNDS.142
2019 NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS FOR NON-DEDICATED FACILITIES,
supra note 130, at i.
134
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Detention facilities that did not meet standards were given
corrective action plans to address deficiencies. 143 ICE did not follow
up with the action plan or hold the detention centers accountable for
its failure to make changes. 144 Other reports also found serious
issues with ICE's detention centers. The GAO reported that ICE
collected inspection results from the Office of Detention Oversight
but did not “systematically analyze” them. 145 Additionally, a 2018
New York Times investigation found that immigrant detention
centers provided barely edible food for detainees and poor health
care. Further, guards were brutal towards detainees, and the
detention centers practiced assorted corner-cutting measures. 146
One factor contributing to detention facilities' failure to meet
PBNDS standards may be due to subcontracting with smaller
private companies to staff and operate the facilities. The
subcontracted companies provide guard services, operate the
medical facilities, and operate the mental health counseling. The
subcontractors prepare food for the detainees, manage
commissioner sales, and control phone and video communications
for detainees. 147 ICE loses oversight by giving private facilities full
control to subcontract smaller companies to operate the detention
centers. 148
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C. Substandard Living Conditions and Medical Services
The PBNDS and the NDS hold that ICE detention centers
are expected to maintain high facility standards of cleanliness and
sanitation to protect detainees, staff, and contractors from injury and
illness. 149 Facilities must provide detainees with a medical
screening during processing no more than twelve hours after arrival
at a detention facility. 150 In addition, facilities must provide access
to appropriate and necessary medical, dental, and mental health care
needs – including in times of emergency. 151 However, detention
facilities have failed to meet the standards outlined by the PBNDS
and the NDS. In 2015, José de Jesús Deniz Sahagun, a 31-year-old
man, died by suicide at CCA's Eloy, Arizona detention center. 152
After being detained at Eloy, Deniz Sahagun told guards that he had
a history of self-harm. 153 However, facility guards neglected his
medical disclosure and placed him in the general population unit.154
Deniz Sahagun started experiencing paranoid thoughts and erratic
behavior, causing a disturbance to those around him.155 Deniz
Sahagun was placed in an observation cell. 156 Within hours, he
grabbed an orange sock and shoved it down his throat, blocking his
windpipe. 157 Deniz Sahagun was still alive when facility guards
noticed he was face down on the cell floor. 158 Seven minutes passed
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150
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before the guards did anything. 159 When paramedics entered his cell
to revive him, he was already dead. 160
In 2016, ICE released an investigative report showing
twenty-one people died in ICE custody. 161 The report details
showed that ICE detention facilities had “subpar medical care,
including inadequate care that contributed to 7 deaths in
detention.” 162 An unannounced investigation by the OIG on four of
ICE's detention centers found that facilities had expired food,
putting detainees at risk for foodborne illnesses. The report also
indicated facilities violated standards, did not adequately segregate
detainees and did not allow outdoor recreation time for detainees
outside their living area. The lack of outdoor recreation was
detrimental to detainees’ mental health. In addition, detainees were
not provided with appropriate clothing and hygiene items to ensure
proper care, and detainee facilities were dilapidated and moldy.163
The OIG recommended that ICE improve its oversight of the
detention facility, management, and operations. 164
The PBNDS specifies that pregnant women be provided
with medical services, as needed, to maintain the health of the
mother and baby. 165 However, facilities provide pregnant women
with limited health services and poor living conditions. While some
detention facilities provide medical care for detainees, they do not
adhere to pregnancy-related medical standards set forth in the
PBNDS. 166 For example, a pregnant woman and her husband were
159
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detained by CBP. 167 While being processed, the woman asked
agents for help because she was in extreme pain. 168 The agents told
her to sit down and continued with the processing. 169 Thirty minutes
later, a baby could be heard crying through the fabric of the woman's
pants. 170 According to ICE standards, ICE must provide pregnant
detainees “access to pregnancy services including routine or
specialized prenatal care, pregnancy testing, comprehensive
counseling and assistance, postpartum follow up, lactation services,
and abortion services.” 171 However, an interview with pregnant
detainees reported that pregnant detainees are only given one of the
listed medical services. 172 Little is done outside the scheduled
medical appointments when detainees seek medical attention. 173
An analysis of pregnant women in detention centers by
GAO found that ICE was seventy-nine percent compliant with their
pregnancy-related performance measures and ninety-one percent of
pregnant women saw an obstetrician-gynecologist within thirty
days of pregnancy confirmation. 174 However, reports show that over
100 complaints have been filed against ICE and CBP.175 Some of
these complaints allege the neglect of pregnant women and girls in
detention centers and the restriction of reproductive health services.
With more than 4,600 pregnant women detained between 2016 and
(Mar. 2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-330.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6HZ8-UCGQ] [hereinafter GAO-20-330].
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2018, 176 immigration detention centers should pay special attention
to pregnant women in custody. However, “the U.S. immigration
detention system is antithetical to reproduction justice, denying
freedom and bodily autonomy.” 177 Detained pregnant women and
girls are denied access to abortion services, even in situations where
they have been reported to have been sexually assaulted. Agents
ignore pregnant women who seek medical assistance, resulting in
countless miscarriages. Pregnant women are shackled around the
waist out of fear that they are flight risks, leading to various health
concerns, including miscarriage. 178
In 2020, a nurse working inside the Irwin County Detention
Center (ICDC) in Georgia filed a whistleblower complaint against
the ICDC after witnessing hysterectomies performed on countless
immigrant women under ICE custody. 179 The complaint
documented that a private physician contracted with ICDC
performed a hysterectomy on “just about everybody.” 180 ICDC sent
detained women to the gynecologist – who performed the
Madiline Morcelle, Im/migrant Detention is Reproductive Injustice, NAT’L
HEALTH L. PROGRAM, (Jan. 11, 2021), https://healthlaw.org/im-migrantdetention-is-reproductive-injustice/ [https://perma.cc/4SQY-NZZS].
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178
Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522, 527, 534 (2009); see
also, Tina Vasquez, OB-GYN Says U.S. Marshals Service is Shackling Detained
Pregnant Migrants, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (May 14, 2019),
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(explaining that pregnant women are less likely to be flight risks because they
fear for the safety of the baby, much less pregnant women on the verge of
giving birth because the pain of childbirth would render the woman immobile).
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hysterectomies without the women’s consent or knowledge. 181 One
woman was told she needed surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, only
to find out later that her uterus had been removed. 182 While a
language barrier may have contributed to the misinformation, ICDC
made minimal attempts to educate these women on the performed
hysterectomies. 183 ICDC failed to provide adequate education and
obtain informed consent from the women. 184 For example, detainees
reported that nurses Googled Spanish to communicate with them
rather than using the language line provided for medical staff. 185
During the Covid-19 outbreak, detention centers did not
meet the Center for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines. 186 The CDC
guidelines required that facilities increase space between
individuals for social distancing; provide personal protective
equipment (PPE) to detainees; prepare alternatives for possible PPE
shortages; provide testing for detainees and medical observation for
those with Covid-19 symptoms, and provide a clean and sanitized
living space. 187 However, medical personnel did not adequately
181
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respond to detainees' sick calls, did not provide face masks, did not
enforce social distancing, and did not notify detainees about their
test results. 188
On May 6, 2020, fifty-seven-year-old Carlos Ernesto
Escobar Mejia died in detention after testing positive for Covid-19.
He was the first Covid-19 death in ICE detention. 189 By May 2021,
nearly 1,500 cases had been reported. 190 A detainee disclosed to
BUZZFEED News that detainees were “given one mask every two
weeks, but the masks fall apart before receiving the new ones.”191
As the number of Covid-19 cases increased in detention centers,
ICE contended that the infection rates rose because migrants
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border were already infected. However,
the ACLU argued that ICE did not create a vaccination program to
reduce infections. BOP holds nearly 130,000 people in the facilities
and has seen fewer Covid-19 cases than ICE detention facilities,
detaining 22,000 immigrants. 192 As of January 5, 2022, there are
938 positive Covid-19 cases out of 22,503 detainees in custody. 193

CUFFARI, supra note 186.
Immigration Detention and Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR.
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/immigrationdetention-and-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/7LQJ-QC5D] (last updated Jan. 7,
2022).
190
Maria Sacchetti, Number of ICE Detainees Testing Positive for the
Coronavirus Rises, WASH. POST., (May 28, 2021, 6:10PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/ice-detainees-coronavirus-casesrise/2021/05/28/e3dd2f30-bf37-11eb-b26e-53663e6be6ff_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7XTH-86BH].
191
Hamed Aleaziz & Adolfo Flores, An Immigrant Who Tested Positive For the
Coronavirus Has Died In ICE Custody, BUZZFEED NEWS,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/ice-detainee-diescoronavirus-otay-mesa [https://perma.cc/6NHB-R8QU] (last updated May, 7,
2020).
192
Sacchetti, supra note 190.
193
COVID-19 ICE DETAINEES STATISTICS BY FACILITY, USCIS (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://www.ice.gov/coronavirus#detStat [https://perma.cc/9Z5U-LKQ2].
188
189

120

IV. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF PRESIDENT BIDEN'S EXECUTIVE
ORDER?
During his presidential campaign, Joe Biden criticized the
Trump Administration for its misguided policies and promised to
protect immigrants held in detention centers. 194 He promised to
build a fair and humane immigration system by restoring the
progress that the Trump Administration had cruelly undone. 195
Biden presented a robust immigration plan to be implemented in his
first 100 days in office. 196 In his first 100 days, the Biden
Administration took ninety-four executive actions on immigration
compared to Trump's thirty executive actions. Despite Biden's
campaign promises to create a better immigration system, none of
his immigration plans addressed the conditions of detention
centers. 197 In his executive order to stop contracts with private
prisons, he stated, “[t]o decrease incarceration levels, we must
reduce profit-based incentives to incarcerate by phasing out the
federal government’s reliance on privately operated criminal
detention facilities.” 198 The order directs the DOJ not to renew any
contracts with private operators once the contracts have expired. 199
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(last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
195
Id.
196
Exec. Order No. 14011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8273, (2021).
197
In His First 100 days in Office, supra note 70 (explaining that the
immigration polices President Biden executed in his first 100 days in office
made significant developments in: interior enforcement—enforcing changes to
ICE’s policies by narrowing the categories of removable noncitizens for arrest
and removal; visa restrictions—terminating Trump’s travel bans on nationals
from 13 predominately Muslim and African countries and lifting the ban on
issuance of certain immigrant visas; humanitarian protection—taking steps to
protect certain national—origin groups from deportation, such as Venezuelans
and Myanmar; and immigration benefits—reversing Trump’s public charge rule
that subjected green card applicants and those renewing temporary visas to a
forward-looking test to assess whether they might ever use public benefits in the
future).
198
Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Directs DOJ To Phase Out Use Of Private Prisons,
HILL (Jan. 26, 2021, 4:37PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/535973-biden-directs-doj-tophase-out-use-of-private-prisons?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/24J2-GR6U].
199
Executive Order on Reforming Our Incarceration System, supra note 18.
194

121

The order applies only to DOJ facilities, consisting of a “dozen
federal private prisons contracted by the BOP and at least a dozen
federal private prisons contracted by the United States Marshals
Services, which mostly holds pretrial inmates.” 200 It does not
include contracting between ICE and private entities. 201 Excluding
DHS and ICE from the executive order makes it even more likely
that private immigration detention centers will remain in business,
and the federal government’s reliance on private detention centers
will continue to grow.
A year after signing the executive order, the Biden
administration has yet to address why the executive order excluded
closures of private immigration detention centers. 202 At a rally in
Georgia, in celebration of his 100 days in office, immigrant
advocates held protests advocating for detention center closures. 203
Biden addressed the audience, agreeing that “[t]here should be no
private prisons, none, period. That’s what they’re talking about –
private detention centers. They should not exist. And we are
working to close all of them.” 204 However, the administration has
not disclosed its plans to close private immigration detention
centers.
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A. Benefiting from the Loophole
While contracts between the DOJ and private companies
have not been renewed, private companies have found a loophole in
the executive order. This loophole allows private companies to
contract with local and county governments which act as the
middlemen between the private companies and the federal
government. 205 By contracting with local and county governments,
private companies are reopening their prisons as detention
centers. 206 Specifically, local officials contract with the federal
agencies to open immigration detention facilities using the prisons
that closed down due to the executive order. 207 The city would then
subcontract the services of the detention facility to the private
company. 208 The Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, owned by
GEO Group in Pennsylvania, closed at the end of March 2021. 209
By September 2021, the center reopened as an immigration
detention center and contracted GEO Group to manage the
detention facility. 210 CoreCivic operated the West Tennessee
Detention Facility in Tipton County, Tennessee, which closed in
September 2021 after its contract with the USMS ended. However,
prior to the prison’s closure, local officials were already in
negotiations with ICE and CoreCivic about the possibility of
operating an immigration detention center. 211
What do local governments gain for being the middleman
between ICE and private companies? Money. Private prisons drive
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the economy of local rural communities 212 and generate jobs for
residents. 213 It comes as no surprise that the possible closure of
private prisons would be devastating to communities. Detention
centers generate millions of dollars in property taxes 214 and are
beneficial to the growth and sustainability of a community.215
Therefore, local and county officials are incentivized to reopen
closed prisons as detention centers in their districts. 216 For example,
CoreCivic owns the Adams County Correctional Center in Adams
County, Mississippi, which holds more than 1,200 ICE detainees
and “generates $1.8 million in real and personal property taxes that
help fund the county and the school district.” 217
Local officials can prevent their communities from suffering
an economic loss by replacing closed prisons with detention centers
because detention centers generate new jobs. 218 John Sobel, the
chairman of the Clearfield County Board of Commissioners where
the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center is located, stated that
opening the immigration detention center saved 330 jobs. 219 In
February 2020, the Adelanto Planning Commission in Adelanto,
California, voted to “allow GEO to convert its 750-bed state prison,
the Desert View Modified Community Correctional Facility, into an
annex for the 1,940-bed federal immigration detention center. . .
.” 220 Despite disagreements from immigration advocates, officials
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ruled in favor of the expansion because the company would provide
approximately $1 million to the city’s annual fiscal mitigation
payments and administrative fees—which made up 10 percent of
the city’s total revenues— and would preserve more than 150
jobs. 221
But not all communities are interested in the money that
detention centers bring in. In communities like Hinton, Oklahoma,
where the local prison’s contract with GEO Group ended, the town
lost 230 jobs and $1.5 million in annual utilities and fees when the
prison closed. 222 Hinton negotiated with GEO Group to reopen the
prison as a “processing facility for illegal immigrants.” 223 However,
Hinton could not follow through with the contract because local
officials did not like the idea of GEO Group releasing detainees into
the local community. 224
Not only do private companies have a reputation for
bringing in more jobs and contributing to the economy. They also
contribute a good amount of money to the community
organizations. 225 For example, in Adelanto, GEO Group paid for the
town’s Little League. 226 In an email exchange between Greg
Hillers, GEO Group’s Assistant Warden of Finance and
Administration, and Jessie Flores, the Adelanto City Manager,
Flores requested $3,500 from GEO Group, stating, “[t]he league is
in desperate need of equipment. . . . Your continued support and
consideration is very much appreciated.” 227 And in Conroe, Texas,
where GEO operates the Montgomery Processing Center, GEO
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Group Foundation awarded a total of $11,000 to individuals
pursuing higher education in the criminal justice field. 228
Since the passing of President Biden’s executive order, the
loophole has been getting more attention. While it may seem as
though this loophole developed because of the executive order, in
fact, the loophole was already being implemented prior to the
enforcement of the order. For example, in 2018, the Adelanto
Processing Facility 229 contracted with ICE directly to operate an
immigration processing center but subcontracted with GEO Group
to run the center. 230 The center provided 760 jobs for residents and
paid about $38 million in economic benefits. City officers continued
to work with GEO Group because of the amount of money that
continued to flow in. 231
If this loophole demonstrates anything, it is that private
companies have financial power in decisions surrounding a town’s
economy and the local community. This loophole allows private
companies to continue operations of detention centers using old
prison facilities and to continue operations outside the purview of
ICE while simultaneously profiting off the federal government.
Still, the Biden administration has not addressed the loophole or the
termination of private detention centers. If they continue to drag out
the conversation about private detention centers, conditions in
immigration detention centers may be worse than what is currently
being reported. Additionally, it enables private companies to
continue profiting from the federal government.
B. Expanding the Executive Order to Include Detention
Centers
The prison reform policy has been criticized by private
companies for closing much-needed facilities 232 and by liberal
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activists and immigration advocates for not taking the opportunity
to completely abolish the private detention center business.233
Activists say that President Biden's executive order is only a
symbolic act, criticizing that it does not go far enough and does not
focus on the effect of abuse in private facilities. 234 Laura Rivera, an
immigration attorney for the Southern Poverty Law Center's Action
Fund and the director for the SPLC's Southeast Immigrant Freedom
Initiative, told The Daily Beast, “It’s unacceptable for the BidenHarris administration to exclude immigrant prisons from today’s
executive order. The very concept of detaining immigrants is rotten
to its core. This is an irredeemable, profit-driven racket that the
Biden-Harris administration must address.” 235 Despite any efforts
from the administration, as of January 26, 2021, only 14,000 out of
the 152,000 prisoners are in BOP custody. 236 “This is only 0.7% of
the total 2 million people incarcerated in the U.S.,” 237 as compared
to 81 percent of immigrants detained in ICE detention centers. 238
What would happen if the executive order did include
language restricting the renewal and contracting with private
companies for immigration detention centers? Extending the
executive order to include immigration detention centers would
allow DHS to develop a new way for processing and housing
detainees. This might allow detainees to stay in the safety of their
own homes and local communities while they await their hearing
with the immigration court. 239 In fact, ICE already has a similar
system in place called the Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program
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through ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO). 240 The
ATD program started in 2004 241 and was created to “increase
compliance with release conditions, court appearances and final
orders of removal while allowing noncitizens to remain in their
communities.” 242 To achieve ATD’s goal, ICE contracts with a
private company that “uses technology and other tools to manage
an undocumented individual’s compliance with release conditions
while they are on the non-detained docket.” 243
The program requires that immigrants live within a 75-mile
radius of the private company, and caseworkers meet with the
immigrants through a combination of face-to-face and telephonic
meetings, unannounced visits to the detainees home, scheduled
office visits, telephone reporting, and GPS monitoring and facial
recognition software. 244 Despite being under ICE’s watch, the
program generates a positive response from immigrants and many
remained consistent with their court order, contrary to what was
expected of the program. In a 2014 evaluation by GAO, it found that
individuals in the ATD program had high rates of compliance with
99 percent of participants appearing for their court hearings. 245
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DETENTION at 2 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-26.pdf
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appropriate during the course of their immigration proceedings, and upon
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Additionally, the cost of immigrants in ATD is considerably less
compared to immigrants in detention centers. In GAO’s 2013
evaluation, the cost for immigrants in ATD was $10.55 compared
to $158 for immigrants in detention centers. 246
Unfortunately, the program is not available to all
immigrants. ERO “prioritizes the apprehension, arrest, and removal
of aliens from the United States who are convicted criminals, pose
a threat to national security, are fugitives or obstruct immigration
controls, or, perhaps most notably, are recent border entrants.”247
Even among immigrants in the United States, ICE looks at an
immigrant’s criminal history, compliance history, community and
family ties, and humanitarian concerns to determine if the person
qualifies for the ATD program. 248 If the ATD program is redesigned
to include families and children, those with families already in the
United States, and individuals without criminal backgrounds, there
would be significantly fewer detainees in detention centers and the
use of those detention centers would fall exponentially, ultimately
saving the U.S. government and the U.S. taxpayers a significant
amount of money.
But the issue of expanding ATD raises the question of what
to do with the other thousands of individuals who do not fit into the
categories above. The ACLU has suggested that the government
replace private detention centers with nonprofit organizations that
can do case management for detainees. 249 Having nonprofits run
detention centers could be a temporary solution. However, the
solution fails to address the issue of proper oversight and regulation.
While the thought of having nonprofits run detention centers may
seem like a better resolution compared to for-profit detention
centers, there is no evidence to show that it would be considerably
better. To complicate this solution further, nonprofit organizations
are regulated by state governments, not the federal government. 250
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This potentially can lead to inconsistent regulatory practices 251 here,
one state may enforce a law limiting detention center contracts to
only nonprofits, and other states can ignore it completely.
It is important to note that just because a detention facility is
run by a nonprofit, it does not mean it is a better facility. Remember
the nonprofit organization Southwest Key Programs from above?
As one of the largest nonprofit organizations operating more than
sixteen detention facilities, Southwest Key has failed to provide
proper medical treatment for the children in its care. 252 In 2014, they
were cited twenty-three times for improper medical care, including
a case “where a clinician failed to follow up for two weeks with a
minor who had tested positive for an STD.” 253 Also, at Endeavors,
a nonprofit in San Antonio, Texas, children were reported to be
detained three times longer than legally allowed. 254 A 17-year-old
girl was kept in Endeavor’s facilities for 86 days even though she
had all the required paperwork necessary to reunite with her father
and brother, who had been in the United States for ten years. 255 A
17-year-old boy in Endeavor’s Pesco, Texas, facility stated that he
spent a whole month at the facility before he was allowed to meet
with a caseworker. 256 While the thought of having nonprofits run
detention centers is hopeful, it does not address the issue of
inadequate living conditions and services.
There is also a possibility that the use of detention centers is
something that will never go away completely. If the United States
decided to stop using detention centers, the federal government
251
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would have to find another way to house immigrants and migrants
crossing the border while they wait for their case to be processed.
This could lead to the creation of holding facilities that reflect the
detention centers of today.
In the event that detention centers do go away, what would
happen to the immigration system and detained immigrants? While
the conditions in detention centers are poor and the detainees lack
much-needed medical attention, not everything about private
immigration detention centers appears to be bad. Rodney King,
Public Affairs Manager for CoreCivic, stated that “privately
operated facilities are better equipped to handle changes in the flow
of illegal immigration because they can open or close facilities as
needed.” 257 In fact, private detention centers can provide an
enclosed space for immigrants who otherwise would be left outside
of the border. For that matter, detention centers are an asset to
immigrants. While this argument identifies an important piece of
detention centers, individuals detained in a confined room with poor
living conditions, expired food, and maltreatment from guards, may
be no better than being left outside the border.
If detention centers cannot go away completely, what is the
best way to address the poor conditions of private detention centers?
One of the main issues with private detention centers is ICE’s
lenient contracting and loose oversight of detention facilities.258
ICE’s contracts include broad terms that give private companies
flexibility in enforcing ICE standards. 259 Additionally, the contracts
include weak, insufficient language regarding facilities’
requirements to meet compliance. 260 Language in the PBNDS
provides detention facilities flexibility in adopting these
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standards. 261 As discussed above, ICE standards are merely
guidelines for the operation of detention centers and are nonbinding. This creates the presumption that detention facilities do not
have to meet or adopt ICE standards. If the Biden Administration
wants to obtain the humane immigration system advertised during
their political campaign, President Biden must first implement a
policy that holds DHS and ICE accountable for their contracts with
private companies and enforce stricter oversight measures. As the
overseeing agency, DHS must be held accountable for its lack of
oversight over ICE’s contracting with private entities. All contracts
conducted by ICE with private entities must be amended with
language clarifying the standards and expectations of detention
facilities according to the PBNDS.
Realistically, it is unlikely that private immigration
detention centers will be completely discontinued. If the
government were to discontinue the use of private immigration
detention centers, an alternative to house the influx of migrants
coming into the United States would need to be found—which the
federal government is not prepared to do at this time.
V. CONCLUSION
The private detention business has rooted itself so deeply
into the U.S. justice system that if the government chooses to end
the contracting of private detention centers, private entities could
simply find a loophole around it, as they have done with the
executive order on prison reform. Whether private detention centers
remain open is of less concern than whether facilities are following
the standards outlined in the PBNDS and doing their part in
providing detainees with standard care. ICE, the agency tasked with
contracting and regulating private detentions, has failed to properly
USCIS, PERFORMANCE-BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (2011) 1,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/pbnds2011r2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KMX-FRA8] (last revised 2016). Language in PBNDS states
generally that “Procedures in italics are specifically required for SPCs, CDFs,
and Dedicated IGSA facilities. Nondedicated IGSA facilities must conform to
these procedures or adopt, adapt or establish alternatives, provided they meet or
exceed the intent represented by these procedures.” Id. However, there are no
mentioned consequences or penalties for failing to meet standards.
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supervise detention facilities, resulting in great and troublesome
issues. These issues include poor living conditions, inadequate
medical services, and the inhumane treatment of detainees. Since
the Biden administration seems hesitant to move toward closing
detention center contracts with private entities, the administration
should enforce stricter laws for ICE management of detention
centers and amend contracts to hold private facilities accountable
for meeting standards.
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